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RECENT CASES
"ATrRACTIVE NUISANCE" DOCTRINE-NEGLIGENCE. [Federal]

In a recent California case, Kataoka v. May Department Stores,' the
plaintiff, a child of four, accompanied by his mother, entered defendant's store and gained access to the upper floor by means of an escalator.
While the mother was talking to a salesman, plaintiff wandered off to
play on the steps of the escalator. As the steps revolved his fingers were
caught between their tread and the protective plate at the top of the
landing. Defendant's manager, unable to pull plaintiff's hand out, reversed the escalator. Plaintiff suffered the partial loss of two fingers. In
an action to recover damages, plaintiff relied on the character of the
escalator as an attractive nuisance, and on the alleged negligence of defendant's manager in the manner in which he extricated plaintiff's
hand. Recovery was denied on the grounds that the escaltor had none
of the characteristics of an attractive nuisance; that, without impairing
its operation, the escalator could not have been constructed in such a
manner that the small fingers of a child of four could not be stuck into
the openings; and that the defendant's manager, acting in an emergency, was guilty of no negligence.
Plaintiff urged the court's reliance upon a Missouri case, Hillerbrand v. May Mercantile Co., 2 which allowed recovery on a similar fact
situation. In that case, while playing on an escalator in the defendant's
store, plaintiff, a child of three who had accompanied her mother to
the store, got her arm caught between the revolving banister and the
floor box from which the protective covering had been left. The court
held that while the escalator was not dangerous to adults, considering
the ways of children it was very likely that some child would be attracted into playing with the rail and thus getting its hand caught in
the floor box; that a person of ordinary prudence should have antici-.
pated and guarded against the risk thus created.
In order to evaluate the principal case, it is necessary to examine the
principles upon'which the doctrine of attractive nuisances was founded.
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Stout3 little impetus was given by the courts of this country
128 F. Supp. 3 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
1141 Mo. App. 122, 121 S W. 326 (1909).

3Sioux City & P. Rd. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. ed. 745 (U. S. 1874)..
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to the theory propounded by the English case of Lynch v. Nurdin,4 the
pioneer case in the field. 5 In the Stout case, the Court, applying general
negligence principles, established the so-called turntable doctrine, by
which liability was imposed upon the owner of an improperly guarded
turntable in an action brought by a child who was injured while playing thereon. The defendant, reasoned the Court, should have anticipated the plaintiffs presence and should have taken the simple precaution of locking the turntable.
It has been the effort to bring the humane doctrine announced in
the early cases6 into harmony with the common law rule that land owners owe trespassers only the duty of refraining from wilful and wanton
acts of aggression, that has led to confusion and misinterpretation by
the courts in establishing the attractive nuisance doctrine.%An inability
satisfactorily to define and delimit it has induced many courts to
abandon the doctrine entirely, 7 or to seek fictional and tenuous bases
for its maintenance.8
'i Q. B. 29 (1841).
5

For a criticism of the basis of the case see Bottum v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 37o, 79 Ad.
858 (1911); cases collected (1925) 36 A. L. R. 49.
6
Harper, The Law of Torts (1933), § 93: ".. . risks that are particularly dangerous
to life and limb which are incidental to artificial structures on the land and which
are likely to attract children thereto and the dangerous character of which are not
likely to be recognized, must be reasonably guarded to protect children actually attracted thereby, although they may be trespassers on the land."
Wan Almen v. Louisville, iSo Ky. 441, 202 S. W. 880 (1918); Friedman v. Snare &
Triest Co., 71 N. J. L. 6o 5 , 61 Atl. 401, 403 (1905): "....there are fundamental, and,
as we think insuperable, difficulties standing in the way of adopting the rule that the
mere attractiveness of private property gives to the person attracted rights against the
owner. One difficulty is that the rule pro tanto ignores the distinction between meum
and teum.... Another and very practical difficulty that confronts the attempt to lay
down any legal rule that depends for its limitations upon the attractiveness of objects to children of tender years lies in the extreme improbability that any man, however prudent, will be able to forsee what may or what may not be attractive to children."; Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 91 Tex. 6o, 41 S.W. 62 (1897),
38 L. R. A. 573 (1898). The doctrine has been abandoned in the following jurisdictions: Rastorello v. Stone, 89 Conn. 286, 93 Atl. .529 ('915); Nelson v. Burnham & M.
Co. 114 Maine 213, 95 At. 1029 (1915); Baltimoie v. DePalma, 137 Md. 179, 112 Atl.
277 (1920); Holbrook v. Aldrich, 168 Mass. 16, 46 N. E. 115 (1897); Ryan v. Tower,
128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (igoi); Devost v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 79 N. H.
411, log At. 839 (1920); Turess v. N. Y., S. & W. Rd., 61 N. J. L. 314, 40 At. 614
(1898); Walsh v. Fitchburg Rd., 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. io68 (1895); Thompson v. B. &
0. Ky., 218 Pa. 444,67 At. 768 (19o7); Bishop v. Union Rd., 14 R. I. 314, 51 Am. Rep.
386 (1884); Bottum v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 At. 858 (1911); Walker v. Potomac, F. &
P. Rd., 105 Va. 226, 53 S.E. 113 (19o5); Ritz v. Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 267, 31 S.E. 993
(1898).
8
Bases that have been adopted: (1) Implied invitation. United Zinc & Chem. Co. v.
Britt, 256 U. S.268, 42 S.Ct. 299, 66 L. ed. 615 (1922), 36 A.L.R.28 (1925); Wilmes v.
Chicago G. W. Rd., x75 Iowa iol, 156 N. W. 877 (1916), L. R. A. 1917 F, 1024 (1917);
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English law refuses to regard children as a class separate from contractors, invitees, licensees or trespassers: 9
"They must be reckoned under one or another of these. The
only respect in which a child differs from an adult is that what
is reasonably safe for an adult may not be reasonably safe for a
child, and what is a warning to an adult may be none to a
child."10
The attractive nuisance doctrine should not be conceived of as an
exception to the rule concerning trespassers, but rather part and parcel
of that rule. Immunity is not granted the landowner, upon whose premises an adult trespasser has been injured, because the trespasser is a
wrongdoer, but because his presence is not to be anticipated and hence,
there is no duty to take precautions for his safety." Liability should be
imposed upon the landowner for an injury to a child when the child's
Ipresence in the neighborhood together with his inclination to
pry
into and intrude upon objects there found, is or should be recognized;
and the landowner, as a reasonable man, should realize that such acMorrison v. Phelps Stone Co., 203 Mo. App. 142, 219 S. W. 393 (1920); Fuselman v.
Yellowstone Valley Land & Irrigation Co., 53 Mont. 254, 163 Pac. 473 (1917). For
criticism see notes and cases collected (1925) 36 A. L. R. 16.
(2) Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n., 37
Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918); Gandy v. Copeland, 2o4 Ala. 366, 86 So. 3 (1920).
But see: Walker v. Potomac, F. & P. Rd., 1o5 Va. 226, 233, 53 S. E. 113, 115 (1905):
"There is one conclusive answer to the argument based on that maxim, and that is,
that it refers only to acts of the landowner, the effects of which extend beyond the
limits of his property."; Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 3; Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission (i898)
i i Harv. L. Rev. 349, 434 at 440.
(3) Trap or pitfall. Faylor v. Great Eastern Quick Silver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App.
194, 187 Pac. 1O (1919); Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557 (1909).
9
Hardy v. Central London Ry., [1920] 3 K. B. 459, 36 T. L. R. 843, 15o L. T. J.
71; Defendant owned a station in which was located an escalator. Children of the
neighborhood frequently played upon it while the station guard was attending other
duties. Plaintiff, a child of five, one of such a group, stuck his hand upon an un-guarded drive belt of the escalator and was injured. Recovery was denied upon the
ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser. "Alurement," said the court, "is a material
-element in considering whether under all of the circumstances leave and license is
where leave and license is distinctly negatived the fact ceases to
to be inferred ....
be relevant." Had a license or an invitation been made out it was thought that recovery would have been allowed since the defendant failed to protect the plaintiff
from a temptation to play with the moving machinery; but inasmuch as the plaintiff
was a trespasser there was no liability upon the landowner for an injury caused by
2n object legitimately upon his land and used in the course of his business.
" 0Winfield, A Text Book of the Law of Tort (1937) § io.
nJohnson v. Atlas Supply Co., 183 S. W. 31, 33 (Tex. 1916): "The law will not
imply anticipation by the owner of an appearance or presence of a trespasser upon
his premises and hence he owes no duty to care for his protection, and where no duty
-exists negligence cannot arise."; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 333, comment b.
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tivity will result in bodily harm to the intruder unless due care be taken
12
to insure its safety.
Lack of agreement as to the instrumentalities to which the doctrine
is applicable has been as widespread as the lack of agreement upon the
principles which underlie the doctine. The courts have widely held
that it should not be extended to objects naturally upon the land,' 3 or
to common objects used in the ordinary course of business, 14 but only
to those objects which the landowner knows, or ought to know, to be
dangerous and attractive to children and located in a place where children usually gather, provided the utility of the dangerous condition
does not outweigh the risk to the children. 15
Inadvisedly, statements have crept into some opinions to the effect
that the attractive nuisance doctrine is applicable to child licenses and
uRestatement, Torts (1934) § 539: "The duty which the rule stated in this section imposes on the possessor of land is based on the well known tendency of children
to.trespass upon the land of others and the necessity of protecting them, even though
trespassers, from their childish lack of attention and judgment."; i Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) 16o: "Liability in the turntable cases is frequently put
upon the ground of implied invitation to children to come upon the premises in
order to play there, the invitation being supposed to arise from the attractive nature
of these dangerous engines. This hypothesis is hatched up to evade the obstacle which
arises from the fact that the plaintiff is a trespasser. But it is as unnecessary as it is
inadequate and artificial. Liability is to be ascribed to the simple fact that the defendant, in maintaining a dangerous agent from which harm may, under particular
conditions, be expected to come, has the primary risk, and must answer in damages
unless a counter assumption of risk can be imposed upon those who go there to
play."; (1936) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 141; (1934) 9 Wis. L. Rev. 431.
2
Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122, 3oo Pac. 993 (1931); Peters v.
Bowman, 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 113, 598, 46 Am. St. Rep. lo6 (1896); Smith, Liability
of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission (1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev.
349, 434" tSalomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742, 206 Pac. 498 (1922); Shea v.
Gurney, 63 Mass. 184, 39 N. E. 996 (1895); Holbrook v. Aldrich, x68 Mass. 15, 46
N. E. 115, 36 L. R. A. 493, 6o Am. St. Rep. 364 (1897): Plaintiff, an infant who had
accompanied her father to the defendant's store, stuck her finger in a coffee grinder.
In denying recovery for the lost finger Justice Holmes reasoned that, at the moment
of the accident, plaintiff was not within the scope of the defendant's implied invitation, hence she was entitled to no protection against such possibilities of harm to herself. "As the common law is understood by most competent authorities, it does not
excuse a trespass because there is a temptation to commit it, or hold property owners
bound to contemplate the infraction of the property right because the temptation to
untrained minds to infringe them might have been foreseen."
1 McKiddy v. Des Moines Electric Co., 206 N. W. 875 (Iowa 1926), and the cases
therein cited; Raeside v. Sioux City, 229 N. IV. 216 (Iowa 193o); Wilmes v. Chicago,
G. W. Rd., 175 Iowa io1, 156 N. W. 877 (1916), L. R. A. 1917F, 1024 (1917); Union
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lunsford, 189 Ky. 785, 225 S. W. 741 (1920); O'Malley v.
St. Paul, M. & M. Rd., 43 Minn. 289, 45 N. W. 44o (189o); Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. v.
Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N. W. 88o (1902), 59 L. R. A. 920 (19o3); Restatement,
Torts (1934) § 339, comment f; Hudson, The Turntable Cases in Federal Courts (1923)
36 Harv. L. Rev. 826, 843-853.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.I

invitees. 16 A careful consideration will show that this is an undersirable
tendency. The doctrine had for its purpose the desire of some courts to
recognize that a trespassing child, who because of his childish instincts
was injured upon the premises in a foreseeable manner, was owed the
duty of due care. Courts which hold that the doctrine is applicable to
invitees and licensees apparently fail to distinguish a very elementary
consideration. If a child invitee be injured by an improperly guarded
"attractive" instrumentality, under circumstances in which, were he a
trespasser, the attractive nuisance doctrine might well be invoked, recovery should be allowed on the basis that the landowner has failed to
17
exercise due care towards the plaintiff invitee.
In view of the principles set out above, the decision in the Kataoka
case' s is a desirable one, although the court has apparently gone out of
its way to deny the applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 19
The defendant violated no duty which it owed the plaintiff; due care
had been taken to construct and maintain the escalator as.safely as was
practicable. It is in this particular that the case is differentiated from
the Hillerbranddecision 20 upon which the plaintiff based his claim. In
the latter case there had been a violation of the duty to take reasonable
precautions for the infant plaintiff's safety. 2 ' It cannot be said that the
"'Central Coal and Coke Co. v. Porter, 17o Ark. 498, 280 S. W. 12 (1926). Contra:
Capp v. City of St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913).
"Branan v. Wimsatt, 298 Fed. 833 (App. D. . 1924); Alabama By-Products Corp.
v. Cosby, 217 Ala. 144, 115 So. 31 (1927); Hayko v. Colorado & Utah Coal Co., 77 Cola.
143, 235 Pac. 373 (1925); Ramsey v. Tuthill Building Material Co., 295 Ill. 395, 129
N. E. 127 (1920), 36 A. L. R. 23 (1925); Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach, 132 Kan 61,
294 Pac. 902 (1931); Jones Savage Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 233 Ky. 198, 25 S. W.
(2d) 373 (1930); Gulf Refining Co. v. Moody, 172 Miss. 377, 16o So. 559 (1935); Garis
v. Eberling, 18 Tenn. App. 1, 71 S. W. (2d) 215 (1934); Armstrong v. Adair, 112 Tex.
439, 247 S. W. 843 (1923); Restatement, Torts (1934) § 341.
In establishing the standard of care one must bear in mind that the tender age
of the child necessitates a greater exercise of precaution. Hillerbrand v. May Mercantile Co., 141 Mo. App. 122, 121 S. W. 326, 328 (19o9): "This doctrine is but one phase
of the wider doctrine that an owner must keep his premises reasonably safe for the
use of people whom he invites to come on them-an application of the general doctrine with special reference to the nature of children, and in accordance with the
principle that what constitutes due care in a given instance depends upon the degree
of danger to be apprehended."
'Kataoka v. May Department Stores, 28 F. Supp. 3 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
"The infant plaintiff is a business visitor. Restatement, Torts (1934) § 332, comment d.
20Hillerbrand v. May Mercantile Co., 141 Mo. App. 122, 121 S. W. 326 (1909).
"Hillerbrand v. May Mercantile Co., 141 Mo. App. 122, 121 S. W. 326, 328 (1909):
"This criticism [of the attractive nuisance doctrine] does not concern us in the present
case, as the plaintiff was in the store by invitation, and it is the unquestioned law
that a person who invited children on his property is liable if he has not used due
care to provide for their safety."
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two decisions represent divergent interpretations of the doctrine under
discussion.
Unfortunate is the previously mentioned conflict regarding the interpretation and applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine 22 for
this leads to its present delimitation and rejection.23 A better understanding will obtain only by a recognition of its real basis. The attractive nuisance doctrine should not be regarded as an exception to any
general rule which could be formulated to describe the duty of a landowner to others. Liability should be imposed in those cases where there
has been a failure to use due care for the safety of trespassing children,
recognizing, in defining the standard of care: (I) the probability of the
child's presence; (2) the probability that his childish instincts will lead
him to use this potentially dangerous object in a manner threatening
injury; (3) the degree to which adequate precautions will impair the
utility of the dangerous instrumentality, together with the total econQmic benefits which might arise from its maintenance; (4) the duty of
the child's guardians to teach him to understand and avoid common
dangers.
EMEY Cox, JR.

2EMINENT DOMAIN-RIGHT OF

RESTRIcTIvE COVENANTEE TO COMPENSA-

TION FOR TAKING OF PROPERTY OF COVENANTOR.

[Georgia]

The recent case of Anderson v. Lynch' involved a suit in equity by
owners of lots in a residential subdivision against another lot owner
and county authorities for an injunction to restrain the defendants from
violating certain covenants and building restrictions. Property owners
in this area held under deeds in which the following covenants were included: (I) the property was not to be used in any manner which would
constitute a nuisance, or injure the value of any of the neighboring lots;
(2) the property was not to be used for store, cemetery, hospital, or sanitarium purposes, but for residential purppses only; (3) the grantor reserved the right to lay and maintain or to authorize property improvements and public utilities, without compensation to any lot owner; (4)
"-This can be explained as arising in part from the opinions of the various courts
as regards the liberality with which such a rule should be applied, which liberality
in turn is influenced by the wide variations of the several fact situations, and the industrial practicability of increasing burdens upon the landowners.
23Notes: (1925) 56 A. L. R. 34; (1925) 39 A. L. R. 486; (1926) 45 A. L. R. 98; (1928)
5

A. L. R. 1344;
13

(1929)

6o A. L. R. 1444.

S. E. (2d) 85 (Ga. 1939)_
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the grantor, or assigns, and any lot owner was to have the right in
event of violation of any of the restrictions, to enforce full compliance
therewith by legal proceedings, costs to be borne by the violating party.
The county, under its right of eminent domain, was about to take a lot
in this residential subdivision for the construction of a public road.
These proceedings were instituted to prevent such action.
The court refused to grant injunctive relief and decided further that
the adjoining owners had no such property interest in the lot condemned as would entitle them to compensation. In arriving at this conclusion it was held that the restrictive covenants conveyed no property
interest;2 and that the covenants, if construed as restricting the right of
the county to acquire and use any of the property for the purpose of es3
tablishing a public road, would be contrary to public policy.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, declaring that no state shall deprive any person of his property
without due process of law, has been construed to preverit the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation; 4 and
most state constitutions contain a clause requiring that compensation
be paid for any private property taken for public use. 5 Admittedly there
was a taking in the principal case, for which the defendant, who was
owner of the lot actually to be used for the road, received ample recompense. But the first issue before the court was whether or not the plaintiffs, the adjoining property owners holding under the restrictive covenants, had such property interest in the condemned lot as would entitle them to compensation.
According to an early view, only a personal interest was created by
the restrictive covenant. 6 vVhile there is a difference of opinion on the
issue, the majority of the courts appear to hold that the covenants create
2In Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, L07 S. E. 872, 16 A. L. R. 1oo 3 (1921), restrictive agreements were called reciprocal negative easements or covenants.
'The court also held that no emergency, as the complainants had contended, was
necessary to give the county authority to establish the public road. This contention
was decided by an earlier Georgia case, Barnard v. Durrence, 22 Ga. App. 8, 95 S. E.
372 (1918), which held that the proposed alteration need not be a public necessity,
as it was sufficient to show the improvement to be of public utility.
4Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 266, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. ed.
979 (1879)'For example, Ill. Const. Art. II, § 13: "Private.property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation." Similar provisions appear in
Conn. Const. Art. First, § is; Fla. Const. Art I,,§ 14; Mass. Const. Part First, § X; Va.
Const. Art. I, § 6,and Art. IV, § 58.
'Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ch. 774 (1848); Pound, The Progress of the Law (1919) 33
Hary. L. Rev. 813.
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such an interest in land as comes under the Statute of Frauds.7 By the
weight of American authority in eminent domain cases a property right
is acquired, and owners of land for whose benefit the restrictions were
imposed are entitled to receive remuneration. 8 The English rule similarly grants compensation for property taken under the Land Clauses
Consolidation Act.9
Yet the decision of the Georgia court in the present instance has an
imposing body of authority in support of it. The court relied to a large
0
extent upon the federal case of United States v. Certain Lands.1
But
'Marsh v. Cheeseman, 221 Ala. 59o, 128 So. 796 (193o); Scheuer v. Britt, 217 Ala.
196, 115 So. 237 (1928); Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 38o, ioo N. E. 622, Ann. Cas.
19 14A 431, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 962 (1913); Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211
N. C. 166, 189 S. E. 628 (1937); Moore v. Shore, 2o6 N. C. 699, 175 S. E. 117 (1934);
Davis v. Robinson, x89 N. C. 589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925); Miller v. Babb, 263 S.W. 25&
(Tex. Comm. App. 1924), 3 Tex. L. Rev. iox; Florsheim v. Reinberger, 173 Wis. 150,
179 N. W. 793 (1920). Contra: Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1925)
21 Mich. L. Rev. 854; Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 23 Ad. 876 (1892); Hegna v.
Peters,

199

Ia.

259, 201

N. IV. 803

(1925).

Some cases enforce the oral convenants

without noticing the possibility of a Statute of Frauds question: See Allen v. City of
Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317 (1911) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.)89o (1912).
8
Town of Stamford v. Vuono, io8 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (1928) (complainant's
property was adjacent to that condemned by the city for construction of a school;
court held that a governmental agency might use the land in violation of the restrictive covenant, but that the complainant was given a right to compensation);
Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917), L. R. A.
i 9 i8B 55; Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N. E. 858 (189o) (adjoining owner
was entitled to damages from the city for the taking of property subject to the easement and erecting buildings thereon near his lot, contrary to the provisions of the
agreement); Johnstone v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 222 N. W. 325 (1928)
(owners of property in subdivision where property was restricted to residences of
certain requirements, were qualified for recompense on the taking of part of such
subdivision for railroad purposes);Allen v. City of Detroit, 169 Mich. 464, 133 N. W.
317 (1911), 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89o (1912) (building of fire station on restricted lots
entitled adjoining owners to compensation); Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W.
1024 (1921), 17 A. L. R. 543 (1922) (where lots were sold subject to building restrictions, the rights conferred by such restrictions were property rights which could not
be taken without just compensation being paid therefor); Hayes v. Waverly & P. Ry.,
51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27 Ad. 648 (1893) (owners were granted an injunction for restraint
of prohibited use by railroad); Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112
N. E. 913, 914-915 (1916) (court held: "These restrictive covenants create a property
right and make direct and compensational the damages which otherwise would be
consequential and noncompensational.... The right of a property owner is measured by the depreciation in value which his land sustains, including such depreciation as will be sustained by reason of the use to which the railroad puts its property,
the difference in value between his land with and without the railroad in operation.')
9
WVarr & Co. v. London City Council [19o4] 1 K. B. 713; Long Eaton Recreation
Grounds Co. v. Midland Ry. Co. [1902] 2 K. B. 574, 18 T. L. R. 743; Kirby v. School
Board for Harrogate [1896] 1 Ch. 437. These cases indicate that in England a restrictive covenant is regarded as a right in land.
201 1 2 Fed. 622 (C. C. D. R. 1. 1899 ).Lots were conveyed by deeds containing pro-
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the Circuit Court in that case did not definitely negative the majority
view that the adjoining land owners are possessed of a property interest. It merely stated that the use for which the government condemned
the land was not contrary to the restriction imposed, conceding that the
adjoining owners had a right in the nature of an easement. 1 Californi4
courts have assumed a more rigid stand concerning equitable servitudes
than did the federal court, denying that a building restriction is a positive easement or right in land, and defining it merely as a right enforceable in equity as between the parties to the contract. 12 In like manner
courts in Texas have said that the restrictions conveyed no affirmative
rights.13 There is other authority in accord with the principal case, sup4
porting the view that no property interest is created.'
In some cases the courts have avoided the necessity of taking a definite position on the question of property interest, by holding that the
use to which the condemning party intended to put the property was
not really in conflict with the covenant. 5
In the light of these conflicting authorities, the formation of a uniform rule concerning the nature of the interest involved appears unhibitions of their use for certain purposes, such as the maintenance of a slaughter
house, smith shop, steam engine, distillery, brewery, saloon, etc. The United States
condemned a portion of such lots as a site for a sea coast fortification. The court was
of the opinion that the future possibility of the government's erecting any slaughter
house or steam engine did not constitute a present invasion of any rights of the other
lot owners, whose property was not taken. It further held that such restrictive conditions could be construed as applying only to the use of property by private individuals for private purposes.
nNew Jersey, in Hayes v. Waverly & P. Ry., 51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27 At. 648, 65o
(1893), held that the restriction "is the right of amenity in the land ...in the nature
of an easement or servitude, appurtenant to the remaining land." Missouri has likewise identified the interest as an easement: Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 6x8, 232 S. W.
1024 (1921),

17 A. L. R. 543

(1922).

"Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919); Friesen v. City of Glendale, 79 Cal. 498, 288 Pac. 1o8o (1930), 19 Cal. L. Rev. 58.
"City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). It is interesting
to note that the same court two years earlier had held that the restrictive covenants
raised an interest in land within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. See supra,
note 71
'Hazen v. Moses, 69 F. (2d) 842 (App. D. C. 1934); Sackett v. Los Angeles School
District, 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P. (2d) 23 (1931); Cook v. Murlin, 202 App. Div. 552,
195 N. Y. S. 793 (1922); Ward v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N. E.
507 (1915; Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 5o5 (1915);
Raleigh Court Corp. v. Faucett, 14o Va. 126, 124 S. E. 433 (1924)"United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C. . -D.R. I. 1899) (possibility

that the government might in the future erect and maintain some forbidden structure did not constitute a present invasion); Friesen v. City of Glendale, 79 Cal. 498,
288 Pac. io8o (1930) (construction of a city street was not inconsistent with "residential purposes').
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likely. But it does seem only just, regardless of whether he acquires a
so-called "property interest" or not, that the covenantee-owner of property should be recompensed for the taking of an interest (and dearly
there is an interest of some sort) that he has in the land of another by
reason of such covenants. The power of eminent domain is said to authorize the taking of "property" for public use. If it also covers rights
in land not technically considered "property," the portion of eminent
domain power authorizing "just compensation" should similarly extend to those rights.
For present purposes, it seems clear that the interest created by restrictive covenants is similar to that acquired in easements for light or
air. Concerning the latter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Ladd v. City of Boston said:
"The right to have land unbuilt upon for the benefit of light,
air, etc., of neighboring land, may be made an easement, within
reasonable limits, by deed."1 6
Such an easement may be created by words of covenant as well as by
words of grant.17 Allen v. City of Detroit8 held a building restriction to
be in the nature of an easement, building on a cit yas well as an individual. The Michigan court's position is made clear by the following language:
"Building restrictions are private property, an interest in real
estate in the nature of an easement, go with the land, and a
property right of value, which cannot be taken for public use
without due process of law and compensation therefor; the validity of such restriction not being affected by the character of the
parties in interest."'19
As is indicated, owners of air and light easement rights in land are concededly entitled to compensation when the servient estate is taken under an eminent domain power. In view of the recognized similarity of
the rights of the easement holder and of the restrictive covenantee, the
latter should be accorded the same protection.
The second issue before the court was that of public policy and its
relation to the issues. In the opinion rendered, a covenant burdening
the free right of the county to acquire and use the property was said to
be contrary to public interest and void. As far as acquiring the prop"151 Mass. 585,

24

N. E. 858, 859 (18go).

2"Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 1o N. E. 253 (1887).
2167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317 (19"), 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890 (1912).
"Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. V. 317, 320 (1911), 36 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 89o, 894

(1912).
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erty is concerned, a government's absolute right of eminent domain is
well established, and no covenant can overcome it.20 Covenants are
valid as between the parties holding under them, but cannot bar the
sovereign's power. However, they may make condemnation utterly impracticable by materially increasing the damages, if damages be allowed. Yet, if value may be added by improvements even to the point
of hindering the operation of eminent domain, it would logically follow that this may also be done by covenants. The authority as to
whether public policy demands a refusal of compensation to covenantees is varied and conflicting. 21 In reason, however, in contradiction to
the present construction, a holding denying one compensation when he
has been damaged in the use of his own property by the actual taking
of his covenantor's land would seem not only contrary to policy but
also to both federal and state constitutions. For one to acquire, through
additional expenditure, land in a restricted area and then have the
value of his property decreased by condemnation proceedings giving
rise to a subsequent forbidden use on nearby lots, appears to be a violation of the protection which the constitutions afford.
Aside from the technical controversy of whether or not a property
interest is created by restrictive covenants, it is conceivable that the
courts which are in accord with the instant decision have refused to admit the creation of a property interest because of the additional burden
which would be placed upon both the condemning governmental
agency and also the court. Undoubtedly a holding to the contrary would
produce an increasing number of compensatory demands for the taking
of other supposed interests. However, if the constitutions demand that
every kind of right in land must be compensated for, the courts should
as far as possible assume the numerous administrative difficulties which
arise in the deciding of eminent domain cases.
FRANK C. BEDINGER, JR.
"All property is subject to eminent domain. United States v. Land in Pendleton
County, W. Va., ii F. Supp. 311 (D. W. Va. 1935); In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38.
P. (2d) 878 (1934); Brimmer v. City of Boston, 102 Mass. 19 (1869).
2
United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C. C. D. R. I. 1899) (decision refusing compensation was largely founded on public policy; but the case was reviewed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed. 876 (C. C. A.
1st, 19o7), which ignored the public policy ground completely); Sackett v. Los Angeles School District, 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P. (2d) 23, 25 (1931) ("Public policy has
been denominated as a vague and uncertain guide at best,... but instances arise
that call for its application'). Flynn v. New York, W. &*B. Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112
N. E. 913 (i16) (restrictive building covenants are not invalid as against public policy). Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505 (1915).
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IN AVIATION OR AERONAUTICS"
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[Federal]

In MassachusettsProtective Association v. Bayersdorferl the insured
was killed in the crash of a commercial plane in which he was a passenger. An insurance policy had been issued to him in 1933 containing a
clause which read: "This policy does not cover death ... sustained as
the result of participation in aviation, aeronautics .... In a suit upon
the policy the District Court2 rejected the insurance company's contention that decedent's death resulted from participation in aviation or
aeronautics and held that the company was liable. On appeal the decision was affirmed, the Circuit Court of Appeals holding that "participation in aviation or aeronautics" meant having something to do with
controlling the flight of the plane, and that the insured as a passenger
had no such part in the flight.
' The first cases in this field were decided early in the 192o's before
the growth of commercial aviation.3 In each of these the policy sued on
contained a clause which provided that it did not cover death "sustained as a result of participation in aeronautics or aviation." Contrary
to the view adopted in the principal case the courts held that the clause
prevented recovery by the beneficiary of a person who had been killed
while a passenger in the plane.4 Any person flying in a plane was said to
be participating in aeronautics or aviation, whether he exercised any
control over the plane or not. This must have been the insurer's intention, the courts concluded, because even the casual rider was in such
danger that he was too great a risk for insurance. During the later
192o's, however, a different result was reached in several suits upon policies which exempted from coverage "death sustained while the insured
was engaged in aviation or aeronautics." 5 In allowing the beneficiary to
1105 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
220 F. Supp. 489 (S. D. Ohio 1937).

3Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 (1921); Meredith v. Business
Men's Acc. Asso. of America, 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976 (1923); Bew v. Traveler's
Ins. Co., 96 N. J. L. 533, 112 Atl. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983 (1921).
'See cases cited supra, n. 3. See Vance on Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 901: "If the
policy excepts the risk of the insured, 'while participating in aeronautics,' his injury
or death on account of riding as a passenger in an airplane is generally held to be
within the exception, but not so if the language of the exception is 'while engaged
in aviation'."
'Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1929), cert. denied, 28o U. S.
564, 50 S. Ct. 24, 74 L. ed. 618 (1927); Benefit Ass'n. of Railroad Employees v. Hayden,
175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995 (1927), 57 A. L. R. 622 (1928); Price v. Prudential Life
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recover in these latter cases, the courts held that to engage in aviation
involves something more than riding as a passenger in an airplane. A
person is not "engaged in aviation," they reasoned, unless he is taking
an active part in the operation of the plane, or unless there is an indication of an intended continuous and occupational relationship.
Again during the present decade there have been several cases in
which the beneficiary has been denied recovery for the insured passenger's death or injury in an airplane crash. In one of these cases0 the
policy contained a clause which exempted the insurer from payment if
the loss resulted from "participation in aeronautics." The court, in this
case, was content to rely on the authority of the earlier cases.7 Recovery
was denied in three other cases8 on the basis of the additional policy
phrase "as a passenger or otherwise." Properly enough it was said that
this provision clears up the ambiguity and shows that the exemption
was intended to exclude from coverage one who was a passenger as well
as one who takes an active part in the operation of the plane.
In the middle of the 193o's, the courts, however, made an abrupt
about-face. Thus, in 1935 a federal court allowed the beneficiary to recover double indemnity on a policy which contained the provision that
the company should not be liable for double indemnity for death resulting from "participation in aeronautics." 9 The court said:
"Aeronautics is defined in the New Century dictionary as 'the
science or art of aerial navigation'.. ..But one who rides in the
plane for the sole purpose of going some place, of being transported by it as a passenger, is not, we think, in the absence of
specific words requiring such construction, participating in aeronautics.... Now, one may know nothing of the science or art,
have no interest in the mechanism, and no control over it, but
may utilize it as a means of transportation. The terms must be
Ins. Co. of America, 98 Fla. io44, 124 So. 817 (1929); Masonic Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jackson,
2oo Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628, 6i A. L. R. 840 (1929); Flanders v. Benefit Ass'n. of Railroad Employees, 226 Mo. App. 149, 43 S. W. (2d) 973 (1931); Peters v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. . 500 (1929).
Italics in quoted policy provision were supplied.
6Sneddon v. Mass. Protective Ass'n., 39 N. M. 74, 39 P. (2d) 1023 (1935).
7Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 SO. 418 (1921); Bew v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 Ad. 859 (1921).
sGoldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied,
292 U. S. 650, 54 S.Ct. 86o, 78 L. ed. 1500 (1933); Head v- N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.
(2d) 517 (C. C.
ioth, 1930); Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 197 S. E.
721 (WV.Va. 1938).

9
Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 78 F. (2d)
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 635, 56 S; Ct. 157 (1935)-

522

(C. C. A. 8th, 1935),
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considered in the light of these known revolutionary changes and
developments in the art."10
The conclusion readied was that the insurance company, by failing to
make a clear expression as to whether a passenger was intended to be
covered, left an ambiguity in the policy, which must be construed most
strongly against the insurer. The preceding year the Supreme Court of
Arkansas decided this question in the same manner."1 In five later cases,
involving the same issue 12 the clause in the policy denied recovery for
"participation in aeronautics," and in all of these cases the beneficiary
was allowed to recover. Four of these cases either expressly or in effect
followed Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. y.,13 the decision representing the first change of opinion in the federal courts, thus resting
their holdings on the proposition that "participation in aeronautics" involves some control over the operation of the plane. The other decision
laid more stress on the reasoning that the clause was an artificial one of
ambiguous content, the court proceeding to resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the insured.' 4 The court pointed out that since the number of
persons who navigate planes is very few in comparison to the number
of passengers carried, and since it is reasonable to believe that the insurance companies will solicit the potential passengers for insurance,
the insurer may very well not have meant to exclude passengers from
coverage.' 5 The court deemed it significant that the word "passenger"
was left out of the policy, as this omission was indicative of a desire of
the companies not to cut down the number of persons to whom they
could sell insurance. If the word "passenger" had been present, the
court would have known that the company did not want to insure any
people who use planes as passengers and thus the present ambiguity
would have been removed.
"78 F. (2d) 522, 523-524 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.635, 56 S. Ct.
157 (935).
"Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S.W. (2d) io8i (1934);
Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 189 Ark. 291, 71 S. W. (2d) 694 (1934).
"Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938);
Marks v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 96 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Swasey v.
Mass. Protective Soc., 96 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Mutual Ben. Health & Acc.
Ass'n. v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Chappell v. Commercial Casualty
Ins. Co., 197 S.E. 723 (W. Va., 1938).
1"78 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.635, 56 S. Ct. 157 (1935).
uMutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
"'The same general idea appears more casually in Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N. Y., 78 F. (2d) 522, at 524 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 269 U. S.635, 56
S. Ct. 157 (1935), wherein the court makes mention of the fact that nearly a million
passengers were then being carried yearly in commercial planes, and that insurance
companies know that the policy holders will be included among person so carried.
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A comparative consideration of the policy phrases "participate" or
"engage" in "aeronautics" or "aviation" reveals no true distinction between the meanings of the terms.' 0 In the Arkansas case of Missouri
State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, already mentioned, a concurring justice
expressed a sound opinion as to the meaning of these words when he
said:
"The distinction thought by the court to exist between 'engage in aeronautics' and 'participation in aviation' may be apparent to, and approved by, those learned in the niceties of the
language and accustomed to its precise use, but it is to be
doubted whether these hairsplitting and subtle distinctions
would occur to, or be understood by, the majority of the thousands of persons who seek insurance against the many hazards to
life and limb which are likely to occur to the most prudent and
fortunate. Words and phrases used in insurance policies should
be construed by their meaning as used in the ordinary
speech of
17
the people and not as understood by scholars."'
Thus, whichever words the policy happens to use, the process of interpretation and the result reached should be the same.
Before the 192o's, because flying was so dangerous, the insurance
companies did not want to take the risk of insuring people riding in
planes in any capacity. Therefore the words "participate" and "engage"
were not ambiguous, as the companies must have meant to exclude
everybody hazarding airplane riding in any manner, and the public
should have so understood. By the 193o's, however, flying had become
so much safer that the companies were no longer required to take materially greater risks in insuring people merely riding occasionally in
planes. Thus, whether in the policies issued during this era the insurers intended to exclude passengers from coverage is doubtful, and the
words "participate" and "engage" become ambiguous. The terms in the
policies being ambiguous, the courts following general insurance law
should construe them against the insurers. This interpretation works
no great hardship on the companies for if they want to exclude passen-.
gers, the policies should expressly so provide.' 8 In fact, since 1934 the
"See discussion in Swasey v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 96 F. (2d) 265 at 266
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938). This conclusion is further borne out by the fact that the late
cases interpret "participate" to include some measure of control or operation of the
plane, which is the same meaning attached to "engage" by the earlier cases, cited
supra, n. 5.
27188 Ark. 907, 69 S. IV. (2d) o81, 1084 (934). This was dictum when first delivered, but was later adopted verbatim in Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
189 Ark. 291, 71 S. W. (2d) 694, 695 (934). See Recent Cases (1939) 28 Ky. L. J.
92, n. 9.
21-'.lany insurance companies are now using clauses which specifically state that a
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results reached by the courts accord with this reasoning, but the above
proposed rationale for arriving at the conclusion has not been clearly
recognized. For the courts appear to take the time of suit as determinitive of whether the terms used should include passengers or not,
whereas the proper time standard for determining the meaning of the
words would seem to be the date of issuance of the policy.' 9 In many of
the opinions, the date of policy is not even mentioned. What the company intended by the insertion of words in a policy in 1920 can only be
deduced by considering the meaning of those words under 1920 conditions. Where such a rapidly developing activity as aviation is concerned,
the application of 1939 concepts to 1920 statements can, to say the least,
hardly be regarded as sound judicial interpretation. G. MuRRAY Smrm,JR.

LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVILEGE-WrORDS SPOKEN TO PLAINTIFF, OVERHEARD BY PERSON HAVING No INTEREST. [England]

The overwhelming majority of cases, both in this country and in
England, hold that even though a qulifiedly privileged defamatory remark be unavoidably or incidentally communicated to a third person,
the privilege is not lost, provided such transmission is made without
malice and as an incident of the ordinary course of business. 1
passenger is covered by the policy only when: (i) he is riding as a paying passenger,
(2) he rides in a licensed plane, (3)the plane is owned by an incorporated passenger
carrier, (4) the plane is operated by a licensed pilot, and (5) the plane is operated
over routes between definitely established airports. See Recent Cases (1939) Ky. L. J.
92, n. io.
"In Marks v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 96 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), the
defendant Insurance Company apparently proposed some such basis for a decision in
its favor. However, the court, while considering the argument, decided against the
insurer because the policy was issued in 1928, at which date "the time for reconsideration of the earlier views [denying liability under 'participate in aeronautics'
clauses] had already arrived." The court's reasoning, though not entirely clear of expression, seems to approximate the approach to the issue recommended by this recent
case discussion.
In the closing paragraph of the opinion in the principal case, the progress of
modem aviation is pointed out at some length, but the writing judge does not make
plain just what significance this fact has in the decision at hand. The concluding observation, "Words, after all, are but labels whose content and meaning are continually shifting with the time", is of course indisputable. But the court is apparently
well satisfied to place the current meaning on the words, regardless of whether the
contract of the parties which uses the words was entered into recently or remotely.
The court's own parting truism is a conviction of such a procedure.
'Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Yount, 66 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933);
Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Watson, 55 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); "Walgreen
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The case of White v. J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio, Limited,2
decided in 193 9 by the English Court of Appeal, however, makes a
radical departure from this rule. One of the defendant's directors accused the plaintiff, a manager of a branch office, of taking funds belonging to the company thereby causing a shortage in his accounts. This accusation was overheard by an employee. Later, the director was also
heard by another employee to accuse the plaintiff of a shortage. The
plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal and slander. The
court denied the defendant the right to set up the defense of qualified
privilege. The ruling was based upon the proposition, that to be privileged, the publisher must have a legal, social, or moral interest or duty
in making the defamatory statement and the person to whom it is made
must have a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. Since neither
of the employees who overheard the remarks had an interest or duty to
receive them, a qualified privilege, it was held, did not exist.
Such a holding does violence to more soundly reasoned decisions.
The Court of Appeal based its holding upon the necessity of reciprocity
of interest or duty, and required that this reciprocity exist between the
publisher and anyone who might hear the defamatory statement, thus
making it unnecessary to decide the question whether there was a
privilege between the plaintiff and defendant. Other cases, however,
v. Cochran, 61 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); New York and Porto Rico S. S. Co. v.
Gracia, 16 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Parr v. Warren-Lamb Lumber Company,
58 S. D. 389, 236 N. W. 291 (1931); Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181, 193-4,
149 Eng. Rep. 1044, o5o (1834): "If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or
exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common
convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make
them within any narrow limits.... I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential
to the protection of such a communication that it should be made to some person
interested in the inquiry, alone, and not in the presence of a third person. If made
with honesty of purpose to a party who has any interest in the inquiry.., the simple
fact that there has been some casual bye-stander cannot alter the nature of the transaction. The business of life could not well be carried on if such restraints were imposed upon this and similar communications, and if, on every occasion in which they
were made, they were not protected unless strictly private. In this class of communications is, no doubt, comprehended the right of a master bona fide to charge his
servant for any supposed misconduct in his service, and to give him admonition and
blame; and we think. that the simple circumstance of the master exercising that right
in the presence of another, does by no means of necessity take away from it the protection-which the law would otherwise afford."; Edmondson v. Birch and Co. Ltd.
and Homer [19o7] 1 K. B. 371; Roff v. British and French Chemical Mfg. Co. and
Gibson [19181 2 K. B. 677; Osborn v. Thomas Boulter and Son [1930] 2 K. B. 226;
Harper, Torts (193a) § 252; Salmond, Torts (8th ed. 1934) § 113; Restatement, Torts
(1938) § 6o, comment c. Notes: (19o9) 2o L. R. A. (N. S.)364, L. R. A. 1915 E. 131,
(1922) 18 A. L. R. 776.
2
1White v. J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Limited, 55 T.L.R. 949 (C.A. 1939).
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seem not to hold that reciprocity must exist between the publisher and
the casual auditor, but that it is sufficient if such is found between the
3
publisher and the person directly addressed.
In reaching the novel result of the principal case, the court attempted to distinguish the earlier case of Toogood v. Spyring,4 decided
by the Court of Exchequer. It will be remembered that in the Toogood
case, the defendant, the Earl of Devon's tenant, charged the plaintiff
with breaking open a cellar door with a chisel, and with getting drunk.
The accusation was made in the presence of a person named Taylor.
The court held that the statement made to the plaintiff, though in the
presence of Taylor, fell within the class of communications called
privileged. The Court of Appeal in the instant case seems to distinguish
the earlier decision on the ground that the principle set out in that case
did not apply to its facts; and while the principle was sound, neither
did it govern in the case at bar on similar facts.5 It is exceedingly difficult to follow the court's attempted distinction. The decision is in fact
a departure from Toogood v. Spyring, although the opinion expressly
states that ".

.

. it would need more than this occasion to overrule so

famous a case as that . . ."0
It is difficult to reconcile the decision in the principal case with the
demands of normal business practice. In fact the court in the Toogood
case must have had such considerations in mind when it said that: "The
business of life could not well be carried on if such restraints were im5
Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Watson, 55 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Walgreen v. Cochran 6i F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); New York and Porto Rico S. S.
Co. v. Gracia, 6 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. Ist, 1926); Edmondson v. Birch and Co., Ltd.
and Homer, [1907] 1 K. B. 371; Roff v. British and French Chemical Mfg. Co. and
Gibson, [1918 ] 2 K. B. 677; Osbum v. Thomas Boulter and Son, [1930 ] 2 K. B. 226.
'Toogood v. Spyring, i Cr. M. & R. 181, 149 Eng. Rep. 1o44 (1834).
'Vhite v. J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Limited, 55 T. L. R. 949, 950 (C. A.
1939): "The only reason for suggesting that 'the person to whom it is made' can include the plaintiff rests on the facts of the old case of Toogood v. Spyring.... I do
not think that it has ever been pointed out, as Mr. Gallop has pointed out to us here,
that, in fact, so far as one can see, the person to. whom one of the statements complained of was published in that case was not the person to whom the speaker had a
duty to communicate or the person who had an interest in receiving that communication, and it may be that the only person who had such an interest was the plaintiff
who was complaining of the words used. For that reason it may be-I do not say that
it is, because it would need more than this occasion to overrule so famous a case as
that-that the general statement of the law, which has been approved over and over
again in subsequent cases, when applied to the actual facts of that case on the question of privileged occasion did not, upon those facts, arise. That does not make the
general statement of the principle of law any less accurate or any less deserving than
it has been found to be by subsequent quotation and approval."
6White v. J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Limited, 55 T. L. R. 949, 950 (C. A.
1939).
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posed upon this and similar communications, and if, on every occasion.
in which they were made, they were not protected unless strictly private."7 Further, it would seem that sufficient protection is presently accorded the employee's interest by the rule which imposes a liability
upon the employer if he gives undue notoriety to his remarks.8 For these
reasons, it is unlikely that the principal case will be followed by other
courts.

FORREST WALL

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-EFFECT OF CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT CLAUSE
ON NEGOTIABILITY.

[Federal]

In the case of United States v. Nagorney,l the Federal DistrictCourt
held a note negotiable which contained an acceleration clause, and a
clause authorizing confession of judgment. This last provision read:
"And to secure payment of said amount, we ... authorize, irrevocably,
any attorney of any court of record to appear for us in such court, in
term time or vacation, at any time hereafter and to confess a judgment
without process in favor of the holder of this note for such amount as
may appear to be unpaid thereon, together with costs and reasonable
attorney's fees ..
" It was contended that this clause authorizing confession of judgment, "any time hereafter," rendered the note nonnegotiable because the Kansas Negotiable Instruments Law2 only authorized a confession of judgment after maturity. The court, however,
by a process of judicial construction held the note negotiable. The
theory of the ruling was that the words, "for such amount as may appear to be unpaid thereon" so qualify the words, "at any time hereafter and to confess a judgment," that the clause, as a whole, constitutes
a power to confess judgment only upon condition that it is not paid at
maturity, the provisions thus falling within the express approbation of
the Kansas statute.
7'Toogood v. Spyring, i Cr. M. & R. 18t, 194, 149 Eng. Rep. io44, io5o (1834).
sSheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 123 Ga. 589, 51 S. E. 646, 648 (1905): "To make the
defense of privilege complete in an action of slander or libel, good faith, an interest
to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only, must appear.
The absence of any one or more of these constituent elements will, as a general rule
prevent the party from relying upon the privilege."; Ivins v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
g7 Ga. App. 684, 141 S. E. 423 (1928); Restatement, Torts (1938) § 604, comment a.
228 F. Supp. 298 (D. Kan. 1939).
2 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1935) c. 52 § 205 (2). This subsection of the Kansas

statute is identical with subsec. 5 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Law- set out hereafter.
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Some few courts have held, as did this one, that a clause authorizing
confession of judgment "at any time hereafter" does not defeat negiotiability, 3 but the general holding has been that such a provision destroys the negiotiability of the instrument.4 The courts have reached the
latter conclusion by a literal interpretation of section 5 (2) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 5 reads:
"An instrument which contains an order or promise to do
any act in addition to the payment of money is not negptiable.
But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which (i) authorizes the sale
of collateral securities in case the instrument be not paid at maturity; or (2) authorizes a confession of judgment if the instrument be not paid at maturity; or (3) waives the benefit of any
law intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor; or
(4) gives the holder an election to require something to be done
in lieu of payment of money. But nothing in this section shall
validate any provision or stipulation otherwise illegal."
This strict interpretation of section 5 (2) proceeds on the theory that
any promise to do anything in addition to the payment of money renders the note non-negotiable unless the additional promise falls within
the expressed exceptions authorized by section 5 of the Act. It is submitted that this strict interpretation of section 5 has led either to a destruction of the negotiability of many otherwise negotiable notes or to
a questionable process of construction in order to uphold the negotiable
character of the instruments. Unless the courts are obliged to adhere absolutely to the literal wording of a declaratory statute, without regard
to the purposes of the Act as disclosed by reading the whole statute together, it is believed that the unfortunate results flowing from such a
construction can be obviated. Realizing the obvious need in our commercial world for paper that moves without impediment it is believed
that section 5 should be interpreted with the broad general purposes of
the Act in view. The types of additional promises which are expressly
approved by that section should be taken as examples of permissible
"luggage" rather than as an exclusive list of valid promises. In other
words, promises which are not foreign to the object of the note but
which are incidental to its normal life and tend to make its payment
sStewart v. Public Industrial Bank, 85 Colo. 546, 277 Pac. 782 (1929); Jones v.
Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 228 N. W. 796 (193o); McDonald v. Mulkey, 32 Wyo. 144, 231
Pac. 662 (1924). In Beard v. Baxter, 258 Ill. App. 340 (1930) such a clause was held
not to defeat negotiability under a peculiar wording of the Illinois statute.
'For collected cases see Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (Beutel's ed. 1938)
151; note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 673.
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more certain should be approved under section 5. Although it would be
absurd to hold negotiable a promise to pay money which carries an additional promise to paint a fence, plow a garden, or deliver cotton, because such promises are completely unrelated to the main purpose of
the note, yet promises to deposit additional security if original security
depreciates, or to pay taxes, costs, or attorney's fees are all ancillary obligations which are inherent in a note and facilitate its collection. The
latter type of promises should be held to be impliedly approved by section 5. Their omission should not be held to imply disapproval. By such
an interpretation it would make no difference in the question of nogotiability whether the confession of judgment was to take place "at
any time hereafter" or only in case of default. Such a view does not insinuate that all jurisdictions should hold all confession of judgment
clauses to be enforceable. The negotiability of the note having been
saved, the courts could treat the confession of judgment clauses as they
see fit in each case, as is done with the provisions to pay attorney's fees. 5
If a particular clause is found to be objectionably harsh t6 the debtor,
it can be held either wholly or partially unenforceable, the negotiability of the note at the same time being upheld. This matter should be
recognized as going to the question of legality rather than negotiability.
The federal court in the case under consideration has arrived at a
desirable conclusion in upholding the negotiability of the instrument,
but the result has proceeded from a questionable and roundabout mode
of construction. The court made its own difficulty by a narrow construction of section 5 (2). It would seem that the same result could have been
reached by simply interpreting section 5 as setting forth an exemplary
rather than an exclusive list of permissible promises.
EDWIN J. FOLTZ

PARENT AND CHILD-ToRT ACTION BY ADOPTED CHILD AGAINST ADOPTIVE

PARENT. [Arkansas]
The case of Brown v. Cole,' decided recently by the Arkansas Supreme Court, presents a situation in which an adopted son is suing his
5
The following cases have held void stipulations for attorney's fees but have upheld the negotiability of the note: Bank of Holly Grove v. Sudbury, 121 Ark. 59, 'So
S. W. 470 (i9k5), Ann. Cas. 917D .,73; Leach v. Urshel, 112 Kan. 629, 212 Pac.
sir (1923); Commerce Trust Co. v- Snelling 113 Kan..272, 214 Pac. 882 (1923); Commercial Credit Co. v. Nisen, 49 S. D. 303, 207 N. W. 61, 5 1 A. L. R. 287 (1926).
The following cases have upheld reasonable attorney's fees: Adolph Ramish Inc.
v. Woodruff, 2 Cal. (2d) 190, 40 P. (2d) 509, 96 A. L; R. 1146 (1934); National Park
Bank of New York v. American Brewing CO., 79 Mont. 542, 257 Pac. 436 (1927).
112 9

S. W_

(2d)-245

(Ark. 1939)-
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adoptive father (both through their administrators) for injuries resulting from a tort inflicted upon the son by the father. In the case it appeared that on the death of his mother, the boy was adopted by his
step-father. Some six years after his adoption, the boy began suffering
intense pain and a few 'days later died of strychnine poisoning. An administrator appointed for his estate brought an action against the adoptive father for pain and suffering endured by the son as a result of the
poisoning. A few days after the suit was filed the father committeed suicide. The court concluded that sufficient evidence had been introduced
to prove that the father was guilty of poisoning his son, and despite the
relationship of adoptive parent and child, allowed recovery of damages
from the father's estate.
The general rule is that a natural child may not maintain an action
to recover damages from a parent for a tort inflicted by the parent upon
the child.2 Although this view has been departed from occasionally in
tlhe last few years, 3 it is still adhered to by the majority of courts.4 The
rationale of the principle denying tort liability is to be found in the
conviction of the courts that to hold otherwise would promote dissension within the family:
"The family is a social unit.... The family fireside is a place
of repose and happiness.... [Society] has a deep interest in maintaining in its integrity and stability the natural conception of the
family unit. This imputes authority to the parent and requires
obedience of the child. To question the authority of the parent
or to encourage the disobedience of the child is to impair the
peace and happiness of the family and undermine the wholesome influence of the home. To permit a child to maintain an
action in tort against the parent is to introduce discord and con'Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 3oo Pac. 7 (1931); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 1o9
Conn. 77, 145 Ad. 753 (1929); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 7o8 (1932);
Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. WV.88, 52 A. L. R. iis8 (1926); Lund v. Olson,
183 Minn. 515, 237 N. W. 188 (1931); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 Ad.
153 (1935); Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, -8o N. E. 277 (1931); Matarese v.
Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 At. 198, 42 A. L. R. 1360 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S. C.
517, 155 S. E.888 (193o); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash, 242, 79 Pac. 788, 68 L. R. A. 893
(igo5). See, Tort Actions Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1939) 1 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 89.
Niemi v. Boston & Maine Ry., 87 N. H. 1, 175 At. 245 (1934); Dunlap v.-Dunlap,
84 N. H. 352, 15o Atl. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1930). See, Tort Actions Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1939) 1 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 89.
'Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) 449.
Of course, parents are criminally liable for injuries inflicted upon their children.
Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. 283, 36 Am. Dec. 322 (Tenn. 1837); Commonwealth v.
Coffey, 121 Mass. 66 (1876); State v. McDonie, 96 W. Va. 219, 123 S.E.405 (1924).
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tention where the laws of nature have established peace and
obedience." 5
In the principal case the Arkansas court was bound by a statute
which provided that: "An adopted child is invested with every legal
right, privilege, and obligation.., as if born to the adopting parents
in legal wedlock." 6 But the court refused to hold that the statute compelled it to apply the general rule forbidding suit for personal injuries
between parent and child, saying:
"in these statutes no attempt is made to invest either the
child or the adopting parents with natural affections existing between blood relations, so the reason for the rule that prevents
natural children from suing natural parents for 'oluntary torts
committed upon them does not exist between adopted children
and adoptive parents. We, therefore, hold that an adopted child
may sue an adoptive father for7 torts committed upon it which
causes him suffering and pain."
Cases considering the situations of adopted children in other respects,
however, do not make such a distinction, for it has been geenrally held
that adopted children occupy exactly the same position in the family as
natural children.8 Thus, in matters of inheritance the Arkansas court
treats adopted children no differently from natural children. 9 Courts
of other states assume the same attitude. 10 In regard to maintenance
and duty to support, no difference of obligation is found." And as regards services due from a child to his parent, no distinction is made between adopted and natural children.' 2 In the words of one court:
"... it is just as much the duty, under the law, of an ad6pting
parent to protect, educate, and maintain his adopted child as if
'Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.

W. 787, 5 A. L. R. 1113, 1114

(1927).

OBrown v. Cole, 129 S.W. (2d) 245, 247 (Ark. 1939).
'Brown v. Cole, 129 S. W. (2d) 245, 248 (Ark. 1939).
8
Shaver v. Nash, 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S.W. (2d) 298, 73 A. L. R. 961 (930); In Re.
Johnson's Estate, 200 Cal. 299, 252 Pac. 1049 (1927); Scott v. Peters, 87 Ind. App. i,
158 N. E. 49o (1927);. Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S. D. 266, I33 N. W. 266 (191i); Rogers
v. Baldridge, i& Tenn. App. 300, 76 S.W. (2d) 655 (1934); Stickles v. Reichardt, 203
Wis. 579, 234 N. W. 728 (ig3i). See cases collected in 2 C. J. S. 446.
OShaverv. Nash, .i8 Ark. 1112,2 9 S. W. (2d) 298,73 A. L. R. 961 (193o).
201n Re Biehnfs Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. (2d) 1112 (1.933), Church v. Lee, 1o2 Ha.
478, 136 So. 242 (1931); Eggimann-Eckard v. Evans, 220 Iowa 762, 263 N. W. 328
(1935); Bakke v. Bakke, 175 Minn. 193, 220 N. W. 6oi (1928); Brown v. Shwinogee,
129 Okla. 149, 261 Pac. 92o (1927).
"In Re Ballou's Estate, 8i& Cal. 61, 183 Pac. 440 (1919); Commonwealth v. Kirk,
2 Ky. 646, 279 S. W. io91, 44 A. L. R. 86 (x926); Wertz v. Wertz, 125 Ore. 53, 263
(1928).
Pac.. 911
Buttrey
v WVest, 212 Ala. 321, 102 So. 456 (1924), Rogers v.Baldridge, 18 Tenn.
App. oo, 76 S. W. (2d) 655 (1934)-
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he were the natural parent, and as a corollary, he is entitled, unparent is, to the custody, control,
der the law, just as the natural
3
and services of the child."'
In the principal case the court bases its result on the premise that
an adopted child does not have the same status as a natural child within
the family unit. But a search of the cases fails to reveal any precedents
for such a holding. Surely an adopted child is an integral part of the
family that adopted him. It is beyond belief that the Arkansas court intends to maintain that, though the policy of the courts under the general rule is to encourage family harmony between a child and his natural parent, the law is not interested in this aim whenever the adoptive
status exists. Yet it is not difficult to carry the reasoning of Brown v.
Cole to this conclusion.
In view of the shocking fact situation in the principal case which
shows clearly that the family solidarity had been disrupted beyond repair prior to the suit, the court was justified in allowing the adoptive
child to recover from the parent. However, in such a situation, recovery should be allowed by a natural child as well. Therefore, the court's
reasoning, based on a distinction between natural and adoptive children, seems unsound. Undoubtedly the court was influenced by the
realization that in this instance the family unit was not merely disrupted but actually destroyed and thus beyond any possible need of
legal protection. Recovery should be allowed both where the family is
actually destroyed by the death of the members who are the parties to
the suit, and where the parties are alive but the family unit is completely disrupted.
STANFORD ScHEIwEL

PROCEDURE-DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.

[Rhode Island]

The plaintiff in the case of Sayles v. McLaughlin,' brought an action
of trespass quare clausum fregit in 1914 against the defendant. After the
pleadings were completed, plaintiff demanded a jury trial which was
set for January, 1915. However, the case was not tried at that time, nor
was it tried subsequently. The defendant died testate in 1917 and executors were appointed the same year. The plaintiff's claim of pending
action was filed against the estate in 1918 and was disallowed. The executors of the defendant's estate resigned, and an administrator was
23McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 267 S. WV.1074, 1075
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'

7

A. (2d) 779 (R. I. 1939)-
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appointed. The plaintiff in October, 1938, filed a motion demanding
that the administrator be summoned to defend the action. The administrator then moved to dismiss the action for want of prosecution. This
motion was granted in the Superior Court, and the case came to the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island upon the plaintiff's exception to the
dismissal. There, the plaintiff's exception was sustained, the court holding that since the defendant himself could have forced the case to a
trial but had been content to let it remain untried, the plaintiff could
not properly be penalized for a lack of diligence in prosecuting the
action.
At early common law, actions at law were not dismissible, the term
"dismiss" being applied to suits in equity alone. It was according to the
equitable doctrine of laches that suits were dismissible if the plaintiff
failed to prosecute with diligence.2 The term has been borrowed from
equity and is now used in common law proceedings.3 By statute and
under the codes, as well as by rule of court, the power to dismiss is now
recognized in law and equity. In England and in many American states
the power is exercised for failure to prosecute, 4 and rests in the inherent
discretion of the court, 5 independent of statute or rule of court.
In the principal case there was no statute granting the power to dismiss, nor had there been an amalgamation of law and equity which
would permit the use of the doctrine of laches, and the Rhode Island
court saw only the one possibility-to decide against the dismissal. Other
courts have taken the same postion.6 The Rhode Island court based its
conclusion on a District of Columbia case, 7 in which jurisdiction, as in
Rhode Island, neither statute nor rule of court dealt with the subject
of dismissal. The position taken by the District of Columbia court was
that, if the defendant himself could have forced the case to trial, but
2

Gray v. Times-Mirror Co., ii Cal. App. 155, 1o4 Pac. 481, 484 (igog): "It is the
policy of the law to favor and to encourage a prompt disposition of litigation ....
The doctrine of laches as a bar to the assertion of stale claims and statutes of limitations rests upon the same reasons or principle."
3
Bullock v. Perry, 2 Stew. and P. 319 (Ala. 1832).
'Mowry v. Weisenborn, 137 Cal. 11o, 69 Pac. 9 7 i (19o2); McAuley v. Orr, 97 S. C.
-14, 81 S. E. 48g (1914); Robinson v. Chadwick, 7 Ch. D. 878 (1876). See collected
cases, 38 C. J. 1191.
6
Colorado E. Ry. v. Union Pac. Ry., 94 Fed. 312*(C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Wisnom ,.
McCarthy, 48 Cal. App. 697, 192 Pac. 337 (1920). See Epley v. Epley, 328 Ill. 582, 16o
N. E. 113, 114 (1928); Waring v. Pennsylvania R..Co., 176 Pa. 172, 35 Ad. io6,
1o7 (1896>. See cases cited in 18 C. J. 1192; 17 Am. Jur. 88.
1
(in Virginia the equitaeCarter's Heirs v. Cooper, iii Va. 6o2, 69 S. E. 944 (9)i
ble doctrine of laches has never been applied to common law actions; the practice is
to require that the defendant file a motion to speed the cause before a dismissal).
7Meloy v. Keenan, 17 App. D. C. 235 (1900).

1939]

RECENT CASES

was content to let the matter rest, he could not complain if the plaintiff
finally took steps toward prosecuting his action.
On the other hand, in the absence of statute many courts have
granted dismissals, relying on their "inherent" power to do so.8 In
California, the practice of dismissing actions at law for failure to prosecute diligently is well established. Although dismissals are provided for
by code in that state, it has been held that the power exists independently of statute.9 It would appear, therefore, that the California cases
would have been adequate authority for the Rhode Island court to rely
upon had it dismissed the action because of plaintiff's inactivity.
There is merit in the rule of the District of Columbia case and in
the court's argument to support it.10 Especially where there has been no
prejudice to the defendant by the delay, there seems to be a fair basis
for denying the motion to dismiss." The defendant's long continued
failure to seek dismissal of the prosecution may. be said to show acquiesence in the plaintiff's delay. However, the California decisions are
based on what appears to be the better rule. This would postulate that
it is the plaintiff alone of whom initiative is to be expected, since he is
the originator of the suit and the cause of the defendant's presence in
court. The defendant's position is an involuntary one; he is put to a
defense only, and can be charged with no neglect for failing to do more
than to meet the plaintiff step for step. The plaintiff is the party
2
charged with diligence in prosecuting the action.'
As a practical matter the decision in the principal case would seem
to be correct, because a dismissal would not bar a subsequent action by
the plaintiff. It is generally held in the absence of statute that res adjudicata would not be a bar to a subsequent action since a dismissal is
'Daly v. Chicago, 295 Ill. 276, 129 N. E. 139 (1920). See Kubli v. Hawkett, 89 Cal.
638, 27 Pac. 57 (1891) and cases therein cited.
OPeople ex rel. Stone v. Jefferds, 126 Cal. 296, 58 Pac. 704 (1899); Hassey v. South
San Francisco Association, 102 Cal. 611, 36 Pac. 945 (1894).

"AMeloy v. Keenan, 17 App. D. C. 235 (1goo); Carter's Heirs v. Cooper, iii Va.
602, 69 S. E. 944 (19tL) (an inactive defendant is not given the privilege of a dismissal
when the plaintiff fails to prosecute seasonably).
2"Overholt v. Matthews, 48 App. D. C. 482 (igig); Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah 588,
15o Pac. 956 (i9s5), L. R. A. 1916 B., xio4; accord Sayre v. Detroit, G. H. and M. Ry.,
199 Mich. 414, 165 N. W. 859 (1917) (even though the delay had caused harm to defendants and rendered them less ready for trial, their motion for dismissal was not
allowed to stand).
nMowry v. Weisenborn, 137 Cal. iio, 69 Pac. 971 (102); Oberkotter v. Spreckels,
64 Cal. App. 470, 221 Pac. 698 (1924); Yampa Valley Coal Co. v. Velotta, 83 Colo. 235,
263 Pac. 717 (1928); Biddle v. Girard Bank, 1o9 Pa. 349 (1885). See Farbstein v.
Woulfe, 265 Pac. 973, 975 (Cal. App., 1928) (dissenting opinion).
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not an adjudication on the merits. 1 3 In Virginia, provision is made by
statute to insure the plaintiff another day in court after his suit has
been dismissed for want of prosecution.' 4 Although the result achieved
may be practical, because upon dismissal plaintiff would have started a
new suit, it does not follow that justice has been done in the principal
case. Over the years the original defendant has died, witnesses may have
died or removed from the jurisdiction, and evidence may have been
lost. Inasmuch as the courts are not able to prevent such unfairness,
remedial legislation 15 should be passed which would make dismissal for
want of prosecution an absolute bar to future action. : 6
JOHN E. PERY

TORTS-PERMISSIBLE CHARACTER OF CONDUCT OF CREDIT AGENCY TowARD DEBTOR; PLEADING-SCOPE OF DEMURRER. [District of Columbia]
In the case of Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington
D. C.,' the plaintiff, owner and operator of a dry-cleaning eitablishment
in the District of Columbia, sued the defendant, an incorporated credit
2
agency, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained by reason of letters
a'Pueblo De Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933); Colorado E.

Ry. v. Union Pac. Ry., 94 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Jernigan v. Pfiefer Bros., 177
Ark. 145, 5 S. W. (2d) 941 (1928); McDonough v. Blosson, 1o9 Maine 141, 83 AtI. 323
(1912); Philpott v. Brown, 16 Neb. 387, 2o N. W. 288 (1884).
"-Va. Code Ann. (Michie 1936) §

6172:

"Any court in which is pending a case

wherein for more than two years there has been no order or proceeding, except to
continue it, may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket; and it shall
thereby be discontinued.... Any such case may be reinstated, on motion,'within one
year from the date of such order, but not after ......
"See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) Rule 41 (b: ...
Unless the court
in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
uIt may be interesting to speculate whether in Rhode Island a subsequent action
would be barred by a statute of limitations objection. See Pesce v. Mondare, 3o R. I.
247, 74 At. 913 (191o); Sullivan v. White and Son, 56 R. . 488, 90 At. 738 (1914);
18 C. J. xx9,-2.
io5 F. (2d) 62 (App. D. C. 1939)'Letters are as follows:
October 2, 1937
Dear Mr. Clark: The member of this Association whose name is shown above, has
reported your account to us with the information that he has not been able to colIect it.
We are members of a nation-wide organization, owned and operated by the retail interests of the country, with members and branch credit bureaus in every locality in the United States. In its files are kept accurate up-to-date credit reports of
the millions of customers of its members.
"robably you haven't realized that this unpaid account may jeopardize your
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sent to the plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was suffering from arterial hypertension and had lost
credit standing. We do not want to enter it against your record if we can help it-so
before taking other steps, we are giving you this opportunity to keep your credit
record clear by paying this bill within the next ten days.
If it is not paid within that time, we will have to proceed with collection, according to our member's instructions.
But we earnestly suggest that you protect your credit and avoid needless expense
by making immediate arrangements with our members or prompt and definite settlement of his account.
Sincerely,
P. S. To avoid delay, make all payments and address all communications direct to the
member whose name is shown above. Use the enclosed addressed envelope.
October 12, 1937
Dear Mr. Clark: Your failure to respond to our last letter about the above account
is disappointing. You have had the utmost consideration and leniency from our member and from us, and yet you have not responded to his requests, nor to ours, for a
settlement.
Do You Realize How Your Continued Neglect of This Account is Going to Affect Your Credit Standing?
As we told you in our last letter, we are members of a mutual, nation-wide Association, owned and operated by the retail credit grantors throughout the country.
Its purpose is to give our members full protection against credit losses-protection
backed by law and the power and prestige of our entire membership.
At the same time it is our desire to protect you, too, against the embarrassment
that follows a "poor pay" record. But you must do your part!
Remember your credit record is the measuring line by which all merchants-all
credit grantors-judge you. Wherever you go, whatever you do, a bad credit record
will follow you like a shadow. Isn't it important for you, then, to keep your record
clear?
Your future credit standing depends on your prompt payment of this account.
Further neglect on your part will necessitate drastic action by the member. Mail your
payment now-direct to the member whose name is shown above-in the addressed
envelope enclosd.
Yours very truly,
October 23, 1937
Dear Mr. Clark: We've been lenient with you-but we havn't even received the courtesy of a reply to our letters. Now it's up to youl
This is your final notice
This Account Must be Paid by Saturday, October 3oth.
You are hereby given our Last and Final Notice that Unless this account is paid
or satisfactorily adjusted on or before the above date, we will retutrn the claim to
the creditor who will no doubt refer it to their attorney, who will take action to secure judgment, with lawful interest together with all costs and disbursements of the
action.
The said attorneys then, without delay, will resort to whatever remedies are offered creditors, such as garnishment or attachment of any salary, funds or property
that may belong to you or that may be due you.
Yours truly,
P. S. Time, expense and trouble will be avoided by making immediate payment to
the member whose name is shown above, using the addressed envelope enclosed.
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but was slowly regaining his sense of sight, and that it was necessary to
its recovery that he avoid excitement and worry; that the defendant had
knowledge of plaintiff's illness; that the letters were sent to the plaintiff
"without any right or color of right, and without justification .... for
the purpose and with the intent of injuring his business and rendering
him unable to conduct it properly"; that by reason of the letters plaintiff's condition was aggravated and he was caused to suffer a severe attack of arterial hypertension and "mental and physical agony."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overruled the
demurrer to the complaint, and sent the case back for a trial on the
merits. The majority of the court confined the case to the single proposition that since defendant by its demurrer admitted that it sought to
cause not merely mental harm but physical harm as well, and since physical harm actually resulted, a case of intentional aggression was made
out. The dissenting justice, however, pointed out that the case contained another point essential to the decision which the majority had
overlooked, namely, a consideration of the proper scope of a demurrerwhat was admitted by defendant when the demurrer was interposed.
The statement in the declaration that the letters were written "without
any right or color of right, and without justification," the dissent
pointed out, was a pleader's conclusion of law, and its corectness was
not admitted by demurrer. Therefore, the dissenting justice thought it
necessary that the court on demurrer examine the letters to see
"whether, in any event, they were sufficient to cause actionable injury to
the plaintiff."3
I
The text authorities, 4 as well as the cases,5 indicate that the dissent8Though the precise grounds for the holding of the dissent are not clearly defined, the approach employed seems to represent common sense and business expediency. In the first part of the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Vinson said that the
problem presented involved a determination of whether the letters were written
"without any right or color of right, and without justification," thus posing the problem as one of intentional aggression but of a privileged nature because of the.
proper character of the letters. However, there is language elsewhere in the dissent
which seems to show that it was not believed that there was any intent to cause harm
at all, but merely an intent to collect a debt. For in the last paragraph of the opinion,
the dissent states that an agency may send these letters to collect a debt in a proper
manner, "though perchance, the debtor may have high blood pressure and that fact
is known to the creditor or his agent."
'Williams, Burks Pleading and Practice (3rd ed. 1934) § 197, p. 323: "That a demurrer does not admit the pleader's inferences or conclusions of law, such as an allegation that the defendant's acts are 'without right.' . . . The court will determine
for itself the effect of the facts alleged." i Ciitty, Pleading (i6th Am. ed. 1883) 963
(e), 964: "it should, however, be remembered that the demurrer admits facts pleaded,
(i e. well pleaded) and merely refers the question of their legal sufficiency to the de-

19391

RECENT CASES

ing judge had the proper approach in considering what was admitted
by the demurrer. The allegation that the letters were sent without any
right or color of right, and without justification, is merely the plaintiff's
conclusion of law and thus not conceded by defendant. The demurrer
admits only facts well pleaded: that the letters were written intentionally for the purpose of collecting the debt; that an unfavorable
credit report would be turned in against the defendant if the debt was
not paid; that suit by the creditor would probably be maintained if the
bill was not paid. Even knowledge of the plaintiff's condition would be
admitted, but the demurrer would not admit that the letters were of
such a nature as to have caused the injury, or to have been written without any right or color of right, or without justification.
The majority opinion, having concluded that the defendant had
confessed being an intentional aggressor without right, then examined his legal responsibility in such position. Mr. Justice Edgerton, for
the court, adopted the view that while a creditor need not use care to
"avoid shocking his debtor, and may intentionally cause him some worry
and concern, nevertheless, he should refrain from conduct intended or
likely to produce physical illness. On this point the majority cited and
discussed a number of cases. The cases referred to, however, support
the rule as stated only because the conduct of the defendants therein
was dearly without right or color of right, or without justification, and
was intended and very likely to cause physical illness. For example, in
Barrettv. Collection Service Co.,6 the defendant knew that the widow's
wages were exempt, yet he sent her a series of threatening letters promising to "bother" plaintiffs employer, "until he is so disgusted with
you he will throw you out the back door." The plaintiff was allowed recovery for mental pain and suffering because defendant had no legally
enforceable claim and was merely trying to frighten plaintiff into making payment, conduct which the law has never tolerated. Again, in LaSalle Extension University v. FogartyT defendant over a period of two
years sent plaintiff some thirty-seven letterswhich varied from moderate
cision of the court." 6 Ency. of Pleading and Practice (1896) p. 336, b., "While a de-

murrer admits traversable facts, it does not admit inferences from them, or conclusions of law"
"St. Louis K. & S. E. R. Co. v. United States, 267 U. S.346, 45 S. Ct. 245, 69 L. ed.
649 (1925); Hobson v. McArthur, 3 McLane (Fed.) 241, Fed. Cas. No. 6, 554 (1843);
Johnson v. Roberts, 102 111.655 (1882); Minnesota Rd. v. Hiatus, 53 Iowa 5oi, 5 N. IV.
703 (1880); Williams v. Mathewson, 73 N. H. 242, 6o At. 687 (1905); Pratt v. Lincoln
County, 6i Wis. 62, 20 N. W. 726 (1884).
0214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. IV. 25 (1932).
7125 Neb. 457, 253 N. -V. 424, 91 A. L. R. 1491 (1934).
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reminders of an unpaid balance to accusations of dishonesty and moral
turpitude. Since the debt was wholly void by virtue of a specific statutory provision, the defendant's conduct was unjustified, and the plaintiff was allowed recovery for worry, humiliation, and loss of sleep. Further, in Wilkinson v. Downton,8 the famous English case relied on by
the majority, the defendant well knowing the true facts and realizing
that his statement was of the grossest type of practical joke and easily
calculated to cause extreme shock and worry, told the plaintiff that her
husband had been injured in an accident. Plaintiff recovered for the
shock because defendant's action was intentional and was knowingly
based on a complete falsehood. The court discussed a number of other
cases, but in none could the conduct of the defendant be compared in
degree with that of the defendant in the instant case, since the 'acts of
the defendants in the cases cited were unwarranted and of a reprehensible nature. 9
On the other hand the dissent asserted that the pleading in this case
does not show as a matter of law that the letters violated any legal right
of the plaintiff. Comparing the actions of the instant defendant with
what the cases hold regarding the propriety of other methods of collec811897] 2 K. B. 57gGreat Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Roch, i6o Md. 189, 153 At. 22 (1931)
(a dead rat was placed by defendant in a wrapper supposed to contain bread, and
the sight of such shocked the plaintiff greatly; recovery was allowed for the shock as
it was intentional and without right); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 2o8 N. W.
814 (1926), 46 A. L. R. 772 (1927) (defendant in a violent outburst, accused plaintiff
of being unchaste, the statement being false, as defendant knew; plaintiffwas allowed
recovery for mental anguish and nervous shock, with resulting impairment of health);
Gadbury v. Bleitz, 13 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925), 44 A. L. R. 425 (1926) (defendant unjustifiably refused to cremate the plaintiff's son, in order to induce the
plaintiff to pay for the previous funeral of a son-in-law; recovery was allowed for the
shock and worry caused the plaintiff by defendant's unlawful conduct); Engle v.
Simmons 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (i9o6), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96 (19o7), 121 Am. St. Rep.
59, 12 Ann. Cas. 74o (defendant, after being requested by plaintiff not to do so, unlawfully entered plaintiff's house to collect a debt from plaintiff's husband in his absence; threats were made by the defendant which threw plaintiff into a state of nervous excitement, and resulted in a premature child-birth with physical disability, for
which recovery was allowed); Stockwell v. Gee, 121 Okla. 207, 249 Pac. 389, 390 (1926)
(defendant, landlord of the plaintiff, came to the premises and in a loud and threatening manner demanded possession; recovery was allowed, because the acts of the
defendant were "unwarranted, unauthorized, and iinlawful'); Patapsco Loan Company v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 98 At. 239 (1916) (defendant, while unlawfully on property of plaintiff made such emphatic and threatening demands on the plaintiff for
payment of a debt, that plaintiff was frightened and siiffered physical illness for
which recovery was allowed); May v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 157 N. C.
416, 72 S. E. 1059 (191), 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) i12 (1912) (though defendant had a right
to enter the land of the plaintiff, he acted in such a boisterous and lewd manner that
plaintiff was made ill and recovery was allowed for the illness).
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tion applied by creditors and their agencies, the conclusion of the dissenting justice seems sound. Because the methods employed in attempting to collect debts vary to a great extent, both in their nature and in
their general effect upon the debtor, it is difficult to formulate a general rule that will cover the cases. It is rather generally held that a
method used in attempting to obtain payment of a debt, which tends
publicly to impute dishonesty to the debtor, 10 or to expose him to disgrace or ridicule," or to invade his right of privacy,' 2 gives the debtor a
right of action for damages against the person employing such a
method. But a mere threat' 3 to sue on a note and foreclose a lien, on
the maker's failure to perform the obligation, would not amount to
duress to support an action. And in McCreavy v. Schneer's,14 where a
creditor sent a letter to his debtor demanding payment of money or a
return of merchandise, the court said: "A creditor still has the right to
ask his debtor to pay what he owes without being subject to any action
for libel." Both opinions in the principal case quoted with approval the
following statement by Professor Magruder:
"We would expect then the gradual emergence of a broad
principle somewhat to this effect: That one who, without just
cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency, purposely
causes a disturbance of another's mental and emotional tranquility of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences
might be not unlikely to result, is subject to liability in damages
for such mental and emotional disturbance even though no demonstrable physical consequences actually ensue. '15
It would appear difficult to put the letters in the principal case in
any milder terms and still hope to get any response from the debtor.
There was nothing vindictive in these letters as in the Barrett case.' 8
Neither was there a charge of dishonesty or moral turpitude, as in Bur2OFerdon v. Dickens 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (19o9); Tyres v. Chambers, 144 La.
723, 81 So. 265 (1919); McClaim v. Reliable Ins. Co., 150 S. C. 459, 148 S. E. 478 (1929);
Burton v. O'Neill, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 613, 25 S. W. 1o3 (1894); Wolfenden v. Giles,

(1892) 2 B. C. 279; Green v. Minnes, 22 Ont. Rep. 177 (1891).
"Thompson v. Adelberg & Breman, 181 Ky. 487, 205 S. W. 558 (1918), 3 A. L. R.
1594 (igig); Axton Fisher Tobacco Company v. Evening Post Company, 169 Ky. 64,
183 S. IV.269 (1916), L.R. A. 19i6E. 667, Ann.Cas. 19i8B 56o; Zier v. Hofflin,33 Minn.
66, 21 N. W. 862, 55 A. L. R. 973, 53 Am. Rep. 9 (1885).
"Gault v. Babbitt, 1 Ill. App. 13o (189o); Brent v. Morgan, 22 Ky. 765, 299 S. W.
967 (1927), 55 A. L. R. 964 (1928). Note (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1070. On improper
methods of collecting debts, see notes: (1928 55 A. L. R. 971- (z937) io6 A. L. R. 1453.
13Shelton v. Lack (Tex. Civ. App.) 19 S.W, (2d) 124 (1929).
2'47 Ga. App. 703, 171 S. E. 391, 392 (1933).
"Magruder, Mental Disturbances in Torts (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. lo33, io58.
2'214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932).
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ton v. O'Niell.17 The only statement savoring of threat was the one regarding the report to the creditor as to "poor pay" if the debt were not
paid. This, however, violates no right of the plaintiff since "such agendes are privileged to supply their customers with what is believed to
be an accurate credit rating of mercantile houses."' 8 As to the merits of
plaintiff's claim, the problem of the principal case may be reduced to
the following: May one who is employed to collect a debt for another
and who has knowledge of the condition of the debtor's health, request
payment even though such request causes physical injury to the debtor,
if the manner in which the request is made is within the "bounds of
decency"' 9 because not vindictive nor defamatory nor invasive of
privacy? Recognition of such a privilege to include the principal case
has much to commend it, for it unquestionably accords with good business practice fortified by common sense.
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Tex. Civ. App. 613, 25 S. W. 1013 (1894).
28Bohlen, Law of Torts (1933) § 249, p. 536 and n. 9 o .
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"Magruder, Mental Disturbances In Torts (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. io33, 1o58.

